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BOOK REVIEW
Décor and decorum
China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement, Nicola
Horsburgh (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), 272 pages, $68.60 (ebook),
$96.00 (hardcover).
Although scholars working in the fields of international relations and security studies encoun-
ter their fair share of ill-defined or disputed concepts, few are as nebulous as the notion of
“nuclear order.” The way the concept is defined and used varies with the theoretical and
policy predilections of the author. Realists, as expected, see the order as a reflection of
power, manifested as a division between nuclear “haves and have-nots,” formal arms-
control treaties, and deterrence relationships. Constructivists, by contrast, tend to see the
nuclear order in a way that harkens back to that classic definition of regimes as “norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a
given area of international relations.”1 Sometimes, the term “nuclear order” serves as a sort
of shorthand to identify the nuclear problematique of the moment, i.e., whether or not
nuclear deterrence, proliferation, or disarmament is the issue of the day.
Nicola Horsburgh delves into this theoretical morass only to surface with a conception of
nuclear order that reflects both the décor and decorum of global nuclear politics. The concept
reflects décor in the sense that it describes the international setting—the issues, actors, strat-
egies, force structures, and politics—that defines the realm of nuclear matters in international
relations. The concept also reflects international decorum by reflecting what constitutes
expected, or at least unacceptable, actions relating to nuclear weapons. Violations of this
decorum do not go unnoticed by nuclear or even non-nuclear states. As a result, one can be
a participant in or a target of the international nuclear order. Horsburgh suggests that
China has found itself in both positions.
Horsburgh uses the concept of nuclear order to organize her survey of the history of China’s
rise as a nuclear power. Nuclear order, it appears, is more tangible when you have no influence
in shaping it, and the People’s Republic was a nuclear outcast from 1949 to 1964, the first
period she surveys. Loose talk about nuclear weapons and paper tigers and Beijing’s efforts
to acquire nuclear weapons made US, Soviet, South Korean, and Japanese officials nervous.
China also bucked growing superpower resistance to nuclear proliferation by advancing the
notion of “socialist proliferation.” In Beijing’s view, proliferation was actually positive when
undertaken by communist states and would ultimately end in disarmament following the
destruction of capitalism, the defeat of imperialism, and the establishment of the global com-
munist nirvana. Once China acquired a primitive nuclear capability, however, Mao Zedung
and his colleagues evidenced more discretion. Between 1964 and 1976, talk about paper
tigers and socialist proliferation ended as Chinese officials recognized that they were passing
through a “window of vulnerability.” Support for more accepted nonproliferation principles
and statements about China’s “minimal” nuclear objectives signaled that Beijing was
seeking acceptance as part of the existing nuclear order in an effort to reduce the risk that
others might launch a preventive nuclear attack to destroy their nuclear enterprise. For
1 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 186.
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years, Beijing attempted to fly under the radar, so to speak, so that the superpowers could grow
accustomed to a new addition to the nuclear club.
By the time the Ronald Reagan administration gained office, enduring trends had taken
hold in China’s nuclear policies. Beijing pursued modest force modernization and growth,
which reflected the judgment that more ambitious programs would spark a reaction by the
superpowers. China also increasingly engaged the international institutions that constituted
the basis of the nuclear order by participating in the Conference on Disarmament, by
signing the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and by placing its civi-
lian nuclear programs under International Atomic Agency Safeguards. Beijing actually came to
depend on this international order; the end of the US-Soviet 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
was a matter of deep concern because it upset the planning assumptions behind its objective of
maintaining a modest nuclear capability.
China and Global Nuclear Order thus makes an important contribution to our understand-
ing of the behavior of nascent nuclear-weapon states in general, and China as a nuclear actor in
particular. As a non-nuclear state with nuclear aspirations, China not only opposed the nuclear
order as a form of oppression of the weak by the strong, but was also identified as a problem to
be contained by the superpowers. As a nuclear state, however, China at first did nothing to
upset the order before slowly embracing it. Horsburgh’s analysis suggests that nuclear
weapons moderate the behavior of policy makers; respecting the decorum demanded by the
nuclear order is the price of admission to the nuclear club. Horsburgh cannot explain
exactly how this process of socialization takes place, but it is clear that the Chinese worked
diligently to develop the analytical and diplomatic expertise to participate constructively in
the nuclear order.
Horsburgh leaves the reader with the observation that most analysts have paid too little
attention to how China’s interaction with the institutions, practices, and actors that populate
the nuclear order shaped its approach to its own nuclear enterprise. It is also clear, however,
that China’s future nuclear posture, especially in relation to the scope and pace of its nuclear
modernization program and its nuclear declaratory policies, may have a significant influence
on the future state of global nuclear matters. If Beijing conducts itself with moderation and
helps to contain North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, then it can “lean in one direc-
tion,” as they say in Beijing, reinforcing the nonproliferation and disarmament elements of the
nuclear order. If China leans in the other direction, then it could just as easily produce signifi-
cant pressures for other nuclear and even non-nuclear states to increase the role of nuclear
weapons in their defense policies.
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